Event source inventory
Security event sources need owners, schemas, selected audit events, severity taxonomy, and time-source records before production audit claims.
Event Sources, Redaction, Triage, and Non-Claims
Latticra records logging, monitoring, and detection requirements before hosted services, production monitoring, detection services, SIEM integration, telemetry export, or security operations claims can promote. It does not implement a log collector, SIEM, telemetry export, host sensor, network sensor, detection rule, alerting service, log storage, or monitoring authority.
Current Rule
Current reporting work is deterministic, local, and no-effect. The baseline requires event-source inventory, audit event selection, runtime decision events, denial reasons, identity/access events, privileged actions, redaction, integrity controls, retention, disposal, triage ownership, and incident handoff before monitoring language can change.
Security event sources need owners, schemas, selected audit events, severity taxonomy, and time-source records before production audit claims.
Runtime decisions, denial reasons, identity/access events, privileged actions, configuration changes, and security errors must be explicit.
Logs require redaction review, secret-marker scanning, integrity controls, access controls, retention, and disposal process records.
Critical log-source disable alerts, detection triage owners, and incident handoff paths are required before detection-service wording.
Current Snapshot
These fields show requirements and denials. They are not evidence of live log collection, SIEM export, telemetry, sensors, alerting, or detection service operation.
Promotion Gate
A future monitoring surface must prove what it observes, how records are shaped, how sensitive material is excluded, how logs are protected, who triages events, and how incidents are handed off before public claims can change.
Baseline record, status record, guard script, local deterministic report surfaces, report-redaction guard, secret-material guard, zero-trust decision-report context, incident handoff context, and supply-chain redaction expectations.
Event-source inventory, log-source owner, schema or field contract, audit event selection, runtime decision events, denial reason events, identity/access events, privileged action events, configuration changes, security errors, severity taxonomy, time source, redaction review, secret-marker scan, integrity control, log access control, retention period, disposal process, centralization or export path, critical source disable alert, triage owner, incident handoff path, and operator-visible non-claims.
Production log monitoring, production audit claims, SIEM integration claims, telemetry export, host monitoring, network monitoring, alerting service, detection-service claims, security-operations claims, and log-collection service claims.
Latticra Boundary
Latticra can report decisions and preserve redaction expectations, but it does not collect telemetry, monitor hosts, export to a SIEM, run sensors, or detect incidents.
Local report surfaces can describe decisions and status without becoming a log collection service.
Runtime policy decisions and denial reasons remain local report fields, not operational monitoring.
Report redaction and secret-material guards protect local evidence wording without claiming production log hygiene.
No log collector, remote telemetry, SIEM export, detection runtime, alerting service, or monitoring authority is added.
Local Commands
These checks validate records and local guardrails. They do not collect logs, export telemetry, run sensors, emit alerts, detect threats, or store monitoring data.
sh scripts/test-security-logging-monitoring-baseline.sh
sh scripts/test-report-redaction-boundary.sh
sh scripts/test-secret-material-guard.sh
sh scripts/test-zero-trust-runtime-authority-baseline.sh
sh scripts/test-cyber-incident-reporting-response-baseline.sh
Source Records